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MANSLAUGHTER BY TEXT: IS ENCOURAGING SUICIDE
MANSLAUGHTER?
Carla Zavala*
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of July 13, 2014, police found an eighteen-yearold dead in his pick-up truck behind a K-Mart in Fairhaven,
Massachusetts.1 It was Conrad Roy, whose mother had reported him
missing after he failed to come home the night before.2 He left his
mother’s house the previous night, around 6:30 p.m., telling her that
he would be visiting a friend.3 Instead, the young man drove to the
Fairhaven K-Mart and filled the passenger cabin of his truck with
carbon monoxide using a combustion engine.4 By the time the police
found Conrad the next morning, he was dead.5 According to the
district attorney’s office, police searched Conrad’s cell phone in the
course of their investigation and found that he had been textmessaging Michelle Carter at the time of his death.6
At the time of Conrad’s suicide, Michelle Carter was a seventeenyear-old high school student. She met Conrad in 2012 while both were
visiting relatives in the same Florida neighborhood.7 The two initiated

* J.D. Candidate 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law. Thank you to Professor
Margaret Lewis for all her guidance and careful edits.
1
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17,
Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015), available
at
http://www.wcvb.com/blob/view/-/34888334/data/1/-/3mh04m//MichelleCarterCourtDocs082415.pdf.
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
See Stephanie Slifer, Is It a Crime to “Encourage Suicide”? Teens’ Texts Under
Scrutiny, CBS NEWS (Mar. 3, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-acrime-to-encourage-suicide-unusual-massachusetts-case-of-conrad-roy-and-michellecarter/.
6
See Investigators Say Plainville Girl ‘Strongly Influenced’ Teen’s Suicide, CBS BOS.
(Feb. 27, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015/02/27/investigators-sayplainville-girl-strongly-influenced-teens-suicide/.
7
See Astead W. Henderdon & John R. Ellement, Judge Won’t Dismiss Case Against
Teen
Who
Urged
Friend’s
Suicide,
BOS. GLOBE
(Sept.
23,
2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/09/23/judge-refuses-dismiss-charge-
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a romantic relationship that was primarily carried on through online
and cell phone communication, with very little in-person contact.8
Initially, Michelle admitted to police that she was talking to Conrad at
the time he committed suicide but claimed she did not know what he
was doing.9 She said that when the phone call ended, she “did not
think much of it.”10 Police were able to recover conversations between
them from Conrad’s cell phone, despite Michelle having asked Conrad
to delete them.11 Conrad’s text messages revealed a very different
picture. For at least a week prior to his suicide, Conrad spoke to
Michelle about his plans to commit suicide.12 Michelle’s own text
messages with a friend revealed that she had a forty-seven minute
telephone conversation with Conrad on the night he committed
suicide.13
On February 5, 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle on charges
of involuntary manslaughter for Conrad’s suicide.14 According to
prosecutors, Michelle:
pressured [Conrad] to go through with suicide for almost a
week before he carried out the act . . . counseled him to
overcome his fears; researched methods of committing suicide
painlessly; and lied to police, his family[,] and her friends
about his whereabouts during the act itself and after.15
The District Attorney believed Michelle’s involvement “caused
Conrad’s death by wantonly and recklessly assisting him in poisoning
himself with carbon monoxide.”16 Bristol County Judge Bettina
Borders agreed and rejected Michelle’s motion to dismiss on
September 23, 2015, allowing the prosecution to proceed with the

plainville-teen-suicide/F6IlTaXG7L6X0MJTQAYuyK/story.html.
8
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 1.
9
See id. at 18.
10
Id.
11
See Abby Phillip, ‘It’s Now or Never’: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure Boyfriend
POST
(Aug.
31,
2015),
into
Suicide,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-ornever-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/.
12
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 1.
13
See id. at 21; see also Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
14
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 1; Slifer, supra note 5.
15
Phillip, supra note 11.
16
Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at
24.
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charges against her.17
Suicide is a significant problem;18 it is the tenth leading cause of
death for people of all ages in the United States.19 For Americans
between ages fifteen and twenty-four, the reality is harsher: suicide is
the second leading cause of death in this age group.20 High school
students seem especially vulnerable to attempting suicide.21 This
means most teenagers and young adults likely know someone who has
had suicidal thoughts or has attempted suicide. What if, instead of
supporting their depressed peers or encouraging them to seek
psychiatric help, people began supporting their plans to commit
suicide and pressuring them to kill themselves? This may be why the
public found Michelle’s actions so appalling.
Even a cursory glance at the public’s comments under news
articles about Michelle’s case will show that many people agree with
the District Attorney’s decision to charge Michelle.22 Certainly, her
17

See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over the
past decade, suicide has increased from a low of 10.4 per 100,000 people in 2000 to
12.1 per 100,000 people in 2013, the most recent year for which data is available. See
Suicide
Facts,
SUICIDE
AWARENESS
VOICES
OF
EDUC.,
http://www.save.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.viewPage&page_id=705D5DF4055B-F1EC-3F66462866FCB4E6 (last visited Mar. 19, 2016).
19
See 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION
(2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/pdf/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_20
13-a.pdf.
20
See id.
21
In 2013, 8% of students in high school attempted suicide, compared to 0.6% of
adults over eighteen years old. See Suicide Facts at a Glance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION
(2015), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicidedatasheet-a.pdf.
22
See, e.g., Mrs.Be, Comment to ‘It’s now or never’: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure
Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2015, 10:02 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-ornever-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/#comments (“This
girl is a sociopath or mentally ill, anyway, she should not be out of prison for a long
time!”); Rs1123, Comment to ‘It’s now or never’: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure
Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST. (Sept. 12, 2015, 10:24 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-ornever-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/#comments (“What
a load of BS. She actively worked to push him to commit suicide, pestered him, told
him how much better off he would be if he was dead, it was a power trip on her part[,]
and she deserves to be prosecuted for it.”); Rwsmls, Comment to ‘It’s now or never’: Texts
Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST. (Sept. 11, 2015, 4:34
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/itsnow-or-never-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/#comments
(“She should spend some serious time in prison. She was as close to pulling the trigger
as you get.”).
18
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actions were not those of a model friend, girlfriend, or citizen. Martin
W. Healy, Chief Legal Counsel at the Massachusetts Bar Association,
commented to the Boston Globe that Michelle’s lawyers “do not have
a particularly sympathetic defendant.”23 But are her actions so
blameworthy that she should spend twenty years in state prison?24 Not
all actions that insult society’s conception of moral conduct give rise to
criminal liability.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the particular circumstances
of Conrad Roy’s suicide and the role Michelle Carter played in it. Part
III of this Comment will analyze the history of how various states have
treated actions comparable to Michelle’s. Part IV will separate the
types of conduct into three categories by the defendant’s level of
participation in the other person’s suicide. Part V will argue that a
statute that specifically proscribes the encouragement of suicide would
be better suited to achieve the societal goals punishment is intended
to serve and would be a better alternative for prosecuting Michelle and
others like her. Part VI briefly concludes.
II. THE CASE AGAINST MICHELLE CARTER
Michelle Carter is accused of encouraging her boyfriend, Conrad
Roy, to commit suicide, which he eventually did. This section will
address the specifics of Michelle’s involvement in Conrad’s suicide.
Then, it will discuss the arguments raised by the prosecution in its
charges against Michelle. Lastly, it will delineate the arguments raised
by Michelle in her defense.
A. Michelle Carter’s Role in Conrad Roy’s Suicide
Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy met in 2012, when both teens
were visiting relatives who lived in Florida.25 Afterwards, they
developed a romantic relationship. Although they both lived in
Massachusetts, their relationship was mostly online.26 According to his
family, Conrad had been struggling with suicidal thoughts and
depression for several years.27 Conrad had attempted suicide in 2012
by ingesting acetaminophen and was treated with medication,
23

Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
In Massachusetts, manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in
state prison. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2015).
25
See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
26
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 1. Some sources have reported that the two teens actually met on the internet prior
to meeting in person. See Phillip, supra note 11.
27
See CBS BOS., supra note 6.
24
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counseling, and hospitalizations at psychiatric facilities.28 Conrad’s
grandmother, however, claimed that Conrad seemed to be “pulling
out of [the depression].”29 Text messages between Michelle and
Conrad show the couple discussed suicide often and in great detail
over the course of their relationship.30 She told him he was strong
enough to do it, and that his parents would understand that he had
reached a point where no one could save him.31
Over time, Michelle became even more involved in Conrad’s
suicide plans. She encouraged him to overcome his fear of death or
failing in his suicide attempt.32 In one text exchange she told him that
once he committed suicide he would finally “[get] to be happy in
heaven. No more pain. No more bad thoughts and worries. [He
would] be free.”33
Michelle even conducted research and
recommended methods of suicide.34 On one occasion, Michelle
specifically suggested that Conrad kill himself by carbon monoxide
poisoning, which would be “painless” and would definitely work.35
When Conrad failed to carry out the plans, Michelle expressed her
frustration to him: “I guess [that I am frustrated], just because you
always say you are gonna do it but you don’t, but last night I know you
really wanted to do it and I’m not mad. Well I mean kind of, I guess.”36
Michelle complained to him that he always had an excuse for not
committing suicide.37
On July 6, 2014, six days before Conrad committed suicide,
Conrad and Michelle discussed the logistics of his suicide plan.38
Michelle told him that with carbon monoxide poisoning he would
“lose consciousness with no pain. [He would] just fall asleep and die.”39
On July 9, Conrad realized that his father’s generator, which he was

28

See Laura Crimaldi, ‘It’s Now or Never,’ Text Said to Friend Allegedly Urged to Kill Self,
BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/25/youhave-just-tonight-night/jTor3lbphOrwZM9KNEPOLJ/story.html.
29
CBS BOS., supra note 6.
30
See Phillip, supra note 11.
31
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 2.
32
See id. at 3.
33
Id.
34
See Phillip, supra note 11.
35
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 2, 3.
36
Id. at 4.
37
See id. at 4–5.
38
See id. at 6.
39
Id.
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going to use to produce carbon monoxide, did not work.40 In the days
that followed, Michelle and Conrad worked on finding another
method to produce carbon monoxide and on ensuring that Conrad’s
parents did not find out about the plan.41
On July 12, 2014, Michelle and Conrad began their conversation
at 4:19 a.m., when Michelle suggested that “[i]t’s probably the best
time now because everyone is sleeping.”42 Throughout the day,
Michelle asked him if he was going to do it that night and told him
repeatedly that he was overthinking and needed to “just do it.”43
Conrad sent his last text message at 6:25 p.m. that evening, when he
left his mother’s house for the K-Mart in Fairhaven, Massachusetts.44
Conrad’s phone records show two forty-minute phone calls with
Michelle that evening.45 During the second phone call, Conrad exited
the car and told Michelle that he was afraid the carbon monoxide
poisoning was working; she told him to “get back in.”46 The next
morning, police found Conrad’s car in the parking lot, after his
mother reported him missing.47 Conrad Roy was dead.
In the days that followed, Michelle told Conrad’s mother and
sister, her own friend Samantha, and the police that she did not know
Conrad planned to commit suicide.48 The police searched Michelle’s
phone and noticed she had deleted her conversation with Conrad after
7:00 p.m. on the evening he committed suicide.49 When she heard that
police were looking into Conrad’s text messages as part of his suicide
investigation, Michelle texted her friend Samantha in a panic, claiming
that if police were to read her messages to Conrad, she would be
“done,” his family would hate her, and she could go to jail.50 In
September, Michelle began telling Samantha that Conrad’s death was
40

See id. at 8.
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 9–10.
42
See id. at 11.
43
See id. at 12–16.
44
See id. at 17.
45
See id.
46
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 17. The police found this information in Michelle’s text messages to her friend
Samantha Boardman on September 15, 2014. See id. at 21 (“I was the one on the phone
with him and he got out of the car because [it] was working and he got scared and I
fucken [sic] told him to get back in, Sam, because I knew he would do it all over again
the next day and I couldn’t have him live that way the way he was living anymore.”).
47
See id.
48
See id. at 17–18.
49
See id. at 18.
50
See id. at 21.
41
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her fault because she could have stopped him but that Samantha
would not understand because she had “never helped someone with a
suicide.”51
B. District Attorney’s Case
In February 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle Carter, then
eighteen years old, for involuntary manslaughter.52 The manslaughter
statute in Massachusetts does not contain a definition for
“manslaughter”; instead, its meaning is derived from the common law
definition.53 Common law defines involuntary manslaughter as “an
unlawful homicide unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes
such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to
amount to wanton or reckless conduct.”54 According to the State,
Michelle’s actions were both objectively and subjectively reckless.55
Michelle was objectively wanton or reckless because “a normal ordinary
woman in [her] position would appreciate the danger in advocating
that carbon monoxide poisoning is a painless and effective way of
committing suicide to a suicidal teen.”56 Alternatively, the prosecution
argued that her conduct was also subjectively wanton or reckless
because, under Michelle’s own admission, she knew that Conrad was
susceptible to suicidal thoughts, and she had advance knowledge of his
plan to commit suicide.57 The State alleged that Michelle caused
51

See id. at 21–22.
See Michael Miller, Michelle Carter Can Face Manslaughter Charge for Allegedly
Encouraging Boyfriend’s Suicide, Judge Rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/24/michellecarter-can-face-manslaughter-charge-for-allegedly-encouraging-boyfriends-suicidejudge-rules/.
53
See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Mass. 1990); see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2015).
54
See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass.
2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 443 Mass. 799, 808 (2005)). For purposes
of manslaughter, “wanton” and “reckless” are considered synonymous. See, e.g., id.
(“Wanton or reckless conduct generally involves a wilful [sic] act that is undertaken in
disregard of the probable harm to others that may result.”); Commonwealth v.
Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944) (“The words ‘wanton’ and ‘reckless’ are
practically synonymous in this connection, although the word ‘wanton’ may contain a
suggestion of arrogance or insolence or heartlessness that is lacking in the word
‘reckless.’ But intentional conduct to which either word applies is followed by the same
legal consequences as though both words applied.”).
55
A defendant can be found guilty of manslaughter if his or her conduct was
either objectively or subjectively reckless. See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am.,
Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211–12 (Mass. 2010); see also discussion infra Part II.C.
56
Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at
27.
57
See id. at 27.
52
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Conrad’s death by enabling him to produce carbon monoxide58 and by
telling him to “get back in [the car]” when he had second thoughts.59
Alternatively, omission or failure to act when the defendant had a
duty to act can also constitute wanton or reckless conduct for purposes
of manslaughter prosecution.60 A defendant has a duty to act if (1) he
or she has a special relationship to the victim or (2) he or she created
a life-threatening condition.61 The State relied on the latter theory,
arguing that Carter created a life-threatening condition for a suicidal
Conrad by directing Conrad to obtain a generator and pressuring him
to commit suicide.62 Because she created the life-threatening
condition, Michelle had a duty to take reasonable steps to alleviate the
risk of him carrying out the plan.63 Michelle could have alleviated the
possible harm to Conrad by either preventing his suicide or alerting
his family of his plans, but she failed to do so.64
C. Defendant’s Argument65
In response to these allegations, Michelle argued that there was
not enough evidence to sustain a charge of involuntary manslaughter
because she was not wanton or reckless. First, Michelle argued she did
not commit an affirmative act that constitutes wanton or reckless
conduct because there was no evidence that “a physical act of force,
pressure, violence, or any direct touching by the defendant whatsoever
led to this manner of death.”66 For this argument, Michelle cited
Massachusetts case law, which requires that a “physical act” cause the
victim’s death in a manslaughter charge that is not based on an
omission.67 She did not provide the physical means for Conrad to
58

See id. at 32.
See id. at 30.
60
See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910–11 (Mass. 1944).
61
See Commonwealth v. Zhan Tang Huang, 25 N.E.3d 315, 328 (Mass. App. Ct.
2015) (“Duty may be established in one of two ways. The first is where the defendant
has a special relationship to the victim. . . . The second is where the defendant ‘creates
a situation that poses a grave risk of death or serious injury to another.’”).
62
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 30.
63
See id. at 29.
64
See id. at 29–30.
65
This Comment will not address Defendant’s arguments that the Massachusetts
Manslaughter Statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case and that
Michelle Carter is not a “youthful offender.” See Defendant’s Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1518, Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE
(Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum], available at
https://www.scribd.com/document/278233136/Defense-motion-to-dismiss .
66
Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 4.
67
See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Mass. 1944) (“Usually
59
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commit suicide, and she was not physically present at the time that he
committed the act.68
Second, Michelle contended she could not be charged under the
alternative theory of wanton or reckless conduct by omission. Michelle
and Conrad did not have a “special relationship” recognized by law
that would give rise to a duty to prevent Conrad from committing
suicide.69 Michelle also argued that she did not “create” the risk of
death for Conrad because he had contemplated suicide before
meeting Michelle; therefore, Michelle did not cause his suicidal
condition.70 Lastly, Michelle argued that her actions were protected by
the First Amendment and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’
protections on free speech.71 Based on these arguments, Michelle filed
a motion to dismiss the charges against her.72 On September 23, 2015,
Bristol County Judge Bettina Borders rejected the motion to dismiss
and ruled that the case would proceed.73
III. PUNISHING SUICIDE AND RELATED OFFENSES
Courts have varied in their treatment of encouraging suicide over
time, with recent cases tending to apply more lenient punishment.
This section will examine the history of punishment for assisting
suicide by discussing: (1) the common law in England and the early
history of the United States; (2) cases that have punished suicide
assistance or encouragement as murder; and (3) more recent cases
tending to punish suicide assistance or encouragement as
manslaughter.
A. Common Law
Common law treated suicide as murder and a felony.74 Under the
common law of England, it was a “crime against the laws of God and

wanton or reckless conduct consists of an affirmative act, like driving an automobile
or discharging a firearm, in disregard of probable harmful consequences to
another.”); see also Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211
(Mass. 2010) (requiring an intentional act); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672,
687 (Mass. 2012) (requiring a physical act).
68
See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 14.
69
See id. at 5.
70
See id. at 9–10.
71
See id. at 17–18 (citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn.
2014)).
72
See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7.
73
See id.
74
See State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987).
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man.”75 However, by the very nature of the crime, the felon was out of
the reach of the law, which created a difficulty in designing a
punishment.76 As punishment, the “goods and chattels of the criminal
were forfeited to the [k]ing, his body had an ignominious burial in the
highway, and he was deemed a murderer of himself and a felon, felo de
se.”77 Because all of the deceased’s property was surrendered to the
king, the felon’s family and heirs were left to suffer the consequences
of the suicide.
The colonies declined to follow the English common law by
requiring forfeiture. For example, the common law of Massachusetts
never required forfeiture of property after suicide.78 Nevertheless,
suicide was still considered malum in se and a felony under
Massachusetts common law.79 An act is malum in se if it is “inherently
immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape.”80 Lacking the ability to
punish the felon, the Massachusetts legislature passed a statute in 1660
denying “the privilege of being buried in the common burying-place
of Christians” to those who committed suicide and instead required
that they be buried on a common highway with a cartload of stones
over the grave.81 Massachusetts was the only state to adopt the English
practice of “ignominious burial.”82 The dishonorable burial was
intended to serve as a “brand of infamy, and as a warning to others to
beware of the like damnable practices.”83 This law remained in place
even after the establishment of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.84
Massachusetts was not the only state to reject the harsh
75

See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877).
See id. at 423 (“It is true, undoubtedly, that suicide cannot be punished by any
proceeding of the courts, for the reason that the person who kills himself has placed
himself beyond the reach of justice, and nothing can be done. But the law,
nevertheless, recognizes suicide as a criminal act, and the attempt at suicide is also
criminal.”).
77
Id. at 425. England abolished the practice of forfeiture in 1870 and finally
abolished suicide as a crime in 1961. See David S. Markson, Note, Punishment of Suicide
- A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1969).
78
See Mink, 123 Mass. at 426.
79
See id.
80
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (10th ed. 2014). See also William L. Barnes,
Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and
Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 646 (1999) (“‘[M]alum in se,’ . . . means wrong in and of
itself.”).
81
See Mink, 123 Mass. at 426.
82
See Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 348, 349 (1986) (citing G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 262, 26061 (1957)).
83
Mink, 123 Mass. at 426.
84
See id.
76
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punishment of suicide at English common law. For example, Michigan
omitted suicide from its criminal law altogether.85 Some states
included provisions in their constitutions prohibiting forfeiture of
property as punishment in general.86 West Virginia went a step further
in 1923 and enacted a statute that specifically prohibited forfeiture of
a person’s estate as punishment for suicide.87 Faced with an inability
to punish the crime, many states decided not to treat suicide as a crime
at all when they moved away from the common law and shifted toward
statutory crimes.88 Other states retained the common law crime of
suicide in order to allow them to punish suicide attempts.89
It is less clear whether assisting suicide was a crime at common law.
According to some sources, aiding, advising, or abetting a suicide was
murderjust as committing suicide was murder.90 The aider and
abettor was treated as “a principal in the second degree to the selfmurder of the other.”91 Other sources suggest the common law
punished assisting suicide under a theory of accomplice liability.92 As
a result, the accomplice was treated differently depending on whether
he or she was present at the time of the suicide. If the accomplice was
present at the time of the act, he or she was considered a principal and
could be convicted of the crime of suicide.93 If the accomplice
encouraged suicide, but was not present at the time of the act, he or
she was considered an accessory, but would avoid punishment because
an accessory could not be convicted without the conviction of the
principal.94 However, this treatment was premised on the idea that
suicide was a crime to which the defendant could be a party, which was
not always the case.95

85

See Donald Wright, Note, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States, 7 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 156, 157 (1975).
86
See id. (citing N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1).
87
See W. VA. CODE § 61-11-4 (2015) (“No suicide or attainder of felony shall work
corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.”).
88
See Wright, supra note 85, at 157.
89
See id.
90
See, e.g., State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987); In re Joseph G., 667
P.2d 1176, 1179 (Cal. 1983).
91
Id.
92
See Wright, supra note 85, at 161.
93
See id.
94
See Markson, supra note 77, at 473.
95
See Sanders v. State, 112 S.W. 68, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (holding that the
defendant could not be an accomplice to suicide because suicide was not a crime in
the state), overruled by Aven v. State, 277 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925).
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B. Encouraging Suicide as Murder
Early decisions by Massachusetts courts treated assisting suicide as
murder. In the 1816 case of Commonwealth v. Bowen, a Massachusetts
court convicted defendant-Bowen for murder after he encouraged a
fellow inmate to commit suicide.96 Bowen’s cell was adjacent to
another prisoner’s, which allowed the men to converse freely with one
another.97 Bowen was accused of encouraging the other prisoner to
commit suicide in order to deprive the sheriff and the townspeople of
the opportunity to see him executed.98 The night before the other
prisoner was scheduled for execution, he took Bowen’s advice and
hung himself in his cell.99 Bowen was charged with murder, and the
court found that “where one counseled [sic] another to commit
suicide, who by reason of his advice, and in his presence, did so, the
adviser was guilty of murder.”100
In 1877, the Massachusetts Supreme Court revisited this
application of the murder statute in Commonwealth v. Mink, which
involved a woman who was charged with murder after accidentally
killing her fiancé during an attempt to kill herself.101 Defendant-Mink
threatened to kill herself when her fiancé threatened to leave her.102
He tried to prevent her from committing suicide, and in the ensuing
struggle, she shot and killed him.103 Though the court proceeded
under a theory of felony murder, it discussed in detail and affirmed
the holding in Bowen, stating that “if a man murders himself, and one
stands by, aiding in and abetting the death, he is as guilty as if he had
conducted himself in the same manner where A[] murders B. And if
one becomes the procuring cause of death, though absent, he is
accessory.”104
This approach to suicide is not unique to Massachusetts. In its
1872 decision, Blackburn v. State,105 an Ohio court heard a case where
the defendant administered poison to a woman, who eventually died
96

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 359-60 (1816). The facts of this case
are largely laid out in a later Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass.
422, 427 (1877).
97
Bowen, 13 Mass. at 356.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877).
101
See id. at 422.
102
See id. at 422–23.
103
See id. at 423.
104
Id. at 428.
105
Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
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as a result.106 Evidence showed that the defendant and the decedent
had agreed to commit suicide together.107 Evidence also showed,
however, that the defendant, “by threats of violence or otherwise,
forced [the woman] to swallow the poison, or forced it down her
throat.”108 The defendant argued that Ohio does not have a law
prohibiting suicide, and therefore, he could “not be a criminal
accessory, nor a criminal principal in the second degree, to an act
which is not itself a crime.”109 The court found it immaterial whether
the victim took the poison by choice or if she succumbed to pressure
from the defendant.110 Instead, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
the defendant was not being prosecuted for assisting in suicide but for
administering poison to another person, which is murder regardless of
the other person’s wishes or condition.111 Similarly, in its 1920
decision, People v. Roberts, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a man
committed murder when he mixed poison for his wife with multiple
sclerosis and left it at her bedside, especially since her condition would
not have allowed her to obtain the poison without his help.112
However, in 1983, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that
Roberts no longer represented the law of Michigan. In People v.
Campbell, the court held that encouraging suicide and even providing
the murder weapon could not be murder because murder was the
unlawful killing of another.113 Campbell was drinking with another man
who became depressed and suicidal during the course of their
drinking together.114 Campbell encouraged the man to buy a gun, and
when he refused, Campbell went to his house to get his own gun.115
Campbell left his gun with the other man, who used it to kill himself.116
Michigan’s murder statute did not include a definition for homicide,
so the court derived its definition from the common law, which
defined homicide as the killing of one human being by another.117
Since the man killed himself, there was no homicide to which
106

See id. at 147.
See id. at 148–49.
108
See id. at 148.
109
Id. at 153.
110
See id. at 162–63.
111
Blackburn, 23 Ohio St. at 163–64.
112
See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920), overruled by People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
113
See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 2930 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
114
See id. at 28.
115
See id.
116
See id. at 29.
117
See id.
107
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Campbell could have been a party.118 Furthermore, in order to find
the defendant guilty, the court required that the defendant want to kill
the man himself, not only that he want the man to die.119 As a final
consideration, the court noted that there had been a trend towards
charging assistance or aiding in a suicide as manslaughter, but not
murder, which the court interpreted as a reflection of the “moral
values of the present day.”120
C. Encouraging Suicide as Manslaughter
Consistent with the observation of the Michigan court in Campbell,
more recent cases have been less harsh than the courts in Bowen and
Blackburn, charging those who encourage or assist suicide with
manslaughter, instead of murder. For example, Massachusetts backed
away from its harsh treatment of encouraging suicide in Bowen and
shifted towards treating it as manslaughter. Massachusetts’s statute
prohibiting manslaughter does not define the term “manslaughter.”121
Instead, manslaughter derives its elements from its common law
definition.122 The common law defined involuntary manslaughter as
“an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused (1) in the commission
of an unlawful act, malum in se, [] not amounting to a felony nor likely
to endanger life . . . or (2) by an act which constitutes such a disregard
of probable harmful consequences to another as to constitute wanton
or reckless conduct.”123 Wanton or reckless conduct is defined as
“intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission
where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.”124 Therefore,
conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires finding that (1) the
defendant intended to commit an act, (2) the act the defendant
intended to commit was wanton or reckless, and (3) the act caused the
victim’s death.125
118

See id. at 30.
See Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 30.
120
See id.
121
“Whoever commits manslaughter shall, except as hereinafter provided, be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or by a
fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail or a house of
correction for not more than two and one half years.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265,
§ 13 (West 2015).
122
See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Mass. 1990).
123
See id. The court in Catalina abolished the first kind of manslaughter, a death
that occurs during an act that is malum in se but not a felony. See id. at 977–78.
124
See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1994).
125
See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211–12
(Mass. 2010).
119
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Conduct satisfies the wanton or reckless requirement if it is either
objectively or subjectively wanton or reckless.126 Conduct is objectively
wanton or reckless “if an ordinary normal [person] under the same
circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.”127 For
conduct to be subjectively wanton or recklessness, the “grave danger to
others must have been apparent and the defendant must have chosen
to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct so as to avoid the
act or omission [that] caused the harm.”128 Lastly, the intentional,
wanton or reckless conduct must be the cause of the death that occurs.
Courts have defined “cause” as conduct which, “in the natural and
continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the
death would not have occurred.”129
A typical manslaughter case is based on affirmative conduct that
causes the death of a victim. Two separate Massachusetts cases are
instructive here. In Commonwealth v. McCauley, the defendant was
charged with involuntary manslaughter after he shot and killed one of
his friends.130 The court found that the evidence that McCauley was
not familiar with guns, had no intent to kill the victim, and did not
know the gun was loaded was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction for
manslaughter.131 More recently, in Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals charged the defendant with
involuntary manslaughter for shooting his friend in the chest.132 Like
in McCauley, the court found the evidence that the defendant “did not
know whether the gun was fully loaded” and his testimony that he had
never fired the gun before sufficient to support a charge of involuntary
manslaughter.133
Encouraging suicide does not fit as neatly into the definition of
manslaughter because there is usually an intervening act by the victim,
which causes death. Still, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
previously upheld a charge of involuntary manslaughter to an alleged
assisted suicide. In Persampieri v. Commonwealth, defendant-Persampieri
126

See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 685 (Mass. 2012) (“Wanton or
reckless conduct is determined based either on the defendant’s specific knowledge or
on what a reasonable person should have known in the circumstances.”).
127
See id. (citing Welansky, 55 N.E.2d at 902).
128
See id.
129
See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Mass. 1980) (citing
th
California Jury Instructions, Criminal § 8.55 (4 rev. ed. 1979)); see also discussion infra
Part IV.
130
See Commonwealth v. McCauley, 246 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Mass. 1969).
131
Id. at 429.
132
See Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, 871 N.E.2d 1085, 1087 (Mass. App. Ct.
2007).
133
See id. at 1089.
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was charged with involuntary manslaughter after his wife committed
suicide.134 Persampieri had allegedly loaded the gun for his wife at her
request and made suggestions that would make it easier for her to
discharge the gun.135 He also taunted her for being “too chicken” to
kill herself, as she had attempted suicide twice before, but failed both
times.136 The court held that involuntary manslaughter was an
appropriate charge because the defendant aided his wife’s self-murder
by being present in the room during the suicide, encouraging his wife
to kill herself, and taunting her with accusations of being too scared to
do it.137
Courts in other states have similarly held that a defendant is guilty
of manslaughter if he or she provides the physical means of suicide
while encouraging the victim to carry out a suicide plan. The Iowa
Supreme Court took this approach in State v. Marti.138 In this 1980 case,
the court held that loading a gun for a suicidal person and
encouraging him or her to commit suicide is criminal because “it
constitutes murder or manslaughter, not because it coincidentally
helped someone to die who wanted to die anyway.”139 In 1992, an
appellate court in New York affirmed a manslaughter conviction where
the defendant goaded the victim to kill himself, knowing that the
victim was drunk and depressed.140 According to the court, the
defendant acted recklessly because he knew there was a substantial risk
that the victim would heed his advice and kill himself, due to his
depression and intoxication.141
IV. CATEGORIES OF ENCOURAGING SUICIDE
Part of the reason that punishing actions like Michelle’s and other
similar cases is so difficult is the lack of clear, legally significant
categories of offenses. Cases involving assisting or encouraging suicide
fall mainly into three broad categories, with varying degrees of
involvement on behalf of both the defendant and the victim. Each
category is defined by the causal connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the other person’s suicide, which is also known as the

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 390.
State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980).
Id. at 581.
See People v. Duffy, 586 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
See id.
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“causation” element of the offense.142 A defendant’s act satisfies the
causation element of a criminal offense if it is both the actual cause
and the proximate cause of the prohibited result.143 In this case, the
prohibited result is the suicide of the other person. First, the
defendant’s act is the actual cause of a suicide if it is a cause without
which the result, in this case the suicide, would not have occurred
when it did.144 Second, the defendant’s act is the proximate cause of
the suicide if it produced the death in a natural and continuous
sequence of events.145 This section will divide the cases into three
categories based on whether the defendant’s actions satisfied these
types of causation for the suicide of another person.
A. Defendant Kills Victim Who Wanted to Die
The first category of cases involves those defendants who
physically kill the victim. Typically, the defendant will be charged with
murder, regardless of the fact that the victim might have wanted to die
anyway. In this category, the defendant is both the proximate cause
and the but-for cause of the other person’s death. In People v. Matlock,146
the defendant claimed that the man he robbed and murdered had
requested that he do so. According to Matlock, the victim wanted to
die so that his family could collect his life insurance policy, but the
policy did not cover suicide, so he enlisted the defendant’s help.147 In
evaluating the defendant’s appeal, the court noted that the defendant
had clearly committed murder, regardless of whether his allegations
about the victim’s wishes were true.148 Similarly, in 1981, the Supreme
Court of Kansas held that murder was an appropriate charge where the
defendant had administered a lethal dose of cocaine at the victim’s
request and later shot the victim in the head when the cocaine failed
to bring about the victim’s death.149
These cases fall easily into the category of murder or voluntary

142

See Michael S. Moore, Causation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 151
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 182–83 (6th ed. 2012).
143
See DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 184.
144
See generally H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 391–92 (2d
ed. 1985); see also DRESSLER, supra note 142, at 184.
145
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 856 N.E.2d 908, 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006);
Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Mass. 1980).
146
People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1959).
147
See id. at 509.
148
See id. at 513 (finding that evidence tending to corroborate the defendant’s
story went solely to the question of the degree of the murder).
149
See State v. Cobb, 625 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Kan. 1981).
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manslaughter, even if they are not typical murders. Although the
victim allegedly wanted to die, their death was still at the hands of the
defendants. In both of these cases, the defendants, not the victims,
were the physical actors. This fact pattern is in-line with both the legal
and the layperson’s concepts of murder. Even Mink can be put in this
category, because, there, the defendant killed her fiancé by
accidentally shooting him; the fact that the fatal shooting happened
during her own suicide attempt is an irrelevant circumstance.150 These
cases fall easily into existing categories of murder or manslaughter.
B. Defendant Provides Instrument Used in Suicide
Another category of cases involves defendants who provide a
suicidal individual with the weapon or means to commit suicide, with
knowledge that the person wanted to commit suicide. In this category,
the defendant is the actual cause—but not the proximate cause—of
the person’s suicide. The defendant gives the individual the means to
commit suicide, but the other person’s act produces the suicide. If the
act of the other was free, deliberate, and informed, the intervening act
is a superseding cause of the suicide.151 Cases that fall in this category
include providing a suicidal individual with a gun;152 loading the gun
for a suicidal individual;153 and providing poison to someone who is
suicidal.154 Cases like these have received more varied treatment from
courts, ranging from murder convictions155 to findings of no liability at
all.156
Courts struggle with these cases because the “victim” commits the
act that directly causes his or her own death, like taking the poison or
shooting themselves with the loaded gun.157 However, the defendant
150

See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877).
See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 144, at 326 (“The free, deliberate, and informed
intervention of a second person, who intends to exploit the situation created by the
first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to relieve the first actor of
criminal responsibility.”).
152
See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
153
See, e.g., State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 580 (Iowa 1980); Persampieri v.
Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961).
154
See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920), overruled by People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994).
155
See Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163–64 (1872), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
156
See Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 29.
157
Compare Roberts, 178 N.W. at 693 (“[W]hen defendant mixed the paris green
with water and placed it within reach of his wife to enable her to put an end to her
suffering by putting an end to her life, he was guilty of murder by means of poison
within the meaning of the statute, even though she requested him to do so.”), with
People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994) (“Where a defendant merely
151
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provided the instrument used for the murder, and in some cases, the
victim would not have been able to obtain the instrument without the
defendant’s action.158 The defendant’s acts are blameworthy, but
would not have led to a death without the victim’s intervening action.
C. Defendant Verbally Encourages Suicide
A third category of cases involves defendants who do not commit
physical actions that lead to the victim’s death. Instead, the defendants
verbally encourage the victim to commit suicide. Arguably, the
defendants in this category of cases are neither the actual cause nor
the proximate cause of the suicide. Not only does the other person’s
free, deliberate, and informed act of committing suicide break the
causal connection,159 but also, the defendant’s act was not an actual
cause of the suicide. The defendant neither kills the other person nor
provides the means for suicide. The defendant is not even physically
with the other individual when he or she commits suicide.160 Thus, the
victim could have committed suicide without the defendant’s
intervention.
In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the defendant did not commit a physical
act to help another person commit suicide.161 Melchert-Dinkel posed
as a suicidal nurse on message boards that provided emotional support
for people who were also suicidal.162 Two of the people with whom
Melchert-Dinkel had contact eventually committed suicide.163 The
individuals who committed suicide lived in England and Canada, while
Melchert-Dinkel was in Minnesota.164 Similarly, Michelle was thirty
miles away when Conrad committed suicide.165 She did not physically
is involved in the events leading up to the death, such as providing the means, the
proper charge is assisting in a suicide [not murder].”).
158
See, e.g., Persampieri, 175 N.E.2d at 389 (victim unable to load gun herself);
Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 28 (victim did not have his own gun); Roberts, 178 N.W. at 191
(victim’s multiple sclerosis made her helpless).
159
See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 144, at 326.
160
At common law, an individual was held liable for the suicide of another if they
were physically present when the other person committed suicide. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816); see also discussion supra Part III.A.
161
See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
162
See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014).
163
See id. at 17–18. Michigan charged Melchert-Dinkel with violating a statute that
criminalized the encouragement and assistance of suicide. See id. at 16. He challenged
the constitutionality of the statute, and the court held it to be invalid as applied to
speech encouraging suicide, but upheld it as applied to assistance of suicide, which
the court defined as “help, which in turn is defined as to provide (a person etc.) with
what is needed for a purpose.” See id. at 20–24.
164
See Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 16.
165
See Slifer, supra note 5.
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plug the power into the generator that caused his death; she did not
provide him with the generator. She was at her home, talking to
Conrad from a remote location.166
Because these defendants were not the actual nor proximate
causes, their cases are much more difficult to fit into traditional
concepts of murder or manslaughter. Nevertheless, the defendants
did contribute, if slightly, to the suicide. Even Michelle knew that she
could potentially face consequences for her encouragement, though
she likely could not imagine she would face charges of manslaughter.167
In some ways, this kind of encouragement seems more culpable than
someone who physically helps a terminally-ill loved one commit
suicide, although the latter would fall into the category of providing
physical means for suicide.168 Even so, defendants who verbally
encourage another’s suicide are distinguishable from usual murder
cases or accidental shootings, which are more typical manslaughters.
V. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
Instead of punishing encouragement169 or physical assistance of
suicide under a theory of murder or manslaughter, states could
proscribe this conduct with a statute that would specifically prohibit
the assistance of suicide. This section will recommend a statute under
which encouragement and assistance to suicide can be prosecuted
without resorting to manslaughter or murder statutes. Then, it will
compare how prosecution under the proposed theory compares to the
current approach in achieving the societal goals that punishment is
supposed to serve.
A. The Statute
In People v. Campbell, when deciding a charge of murder for
assisting suicide, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the decision
of whether to criminalize incitement to suicide belongs to the
166

See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 12.
See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1,
at 21 (“I didn’t bully him or anything? So you don’t think they’ll really tell his family?”).
168
See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 691–92 (Mich. 1920) (defendant
provided his wife with poison to relieve her of the pain caused by multiple sclerosis),
overruled by People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994). This Comment
will not discuss the specific circumstance of physician-assisted suicide, as that specific
circumstance raises very different issues and requires different safeguards and
treatment in law.
169
For purposes of this discussion, “encouragement” is defined as verbal
incitement, as distinguished from providing material assistance, which is used to
denote physical participation in the suicide (i.e. providing a gun).
167
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legislature.170 The Model Penal Code treats “causing” a suicide as
criminal homicide “only if [the defendant] purposely causes such
suicide by force, duress or deception.”171 A separate provision makes it
a crime to “aid or solicit” suicide.172 An example of “causing” suicide
would be a defendant who brutally beats a victim, threatening that if
she does not jump out of an eleventh floor window to her death, he
will personally beat her to death.173 Though the defendant did not
physically throw the victim out of the window, the victim committed
suicide under duress. This kind of duress or coercion is different from
a case where a defendant provides a gun or verbal encouragement to
an individual who was already suicidal before the defendant
intervened.
Verbal encouragement and physical assistance would fall into the
category of “aiding or soliciting” suicide, which is a second degree
felony and an offense separate from homicide, under the Model Penal
Code’s formulation.174 The maximum sentence for second degree
felonies in the Model Penal Code’s tentative sentencing guidelines is
twenty years imprisonment, which was increased from ten years
imprisonment in the original draft.175 Some states have enacted
specific statutes that criminalize assisting or aiding suicide, but punish
the offense at or about the same level as manslaughter.176 A specific
statute should include provisions for lesser punishment, to
accommodate the diminished culpability of the defendant, in light of
the victim’s own intervening acts that caused his or her death.
A specific statute should also provide a definition for what kind of
assistance would rise to the level of “aid” to a suicide. One suggestion
170

See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). Other courts
have also taken a similar position, finding no liability for assisting or aiding suicide in
the absence of a specific statute prohibiting the act. See, e.g., Grace v. State, 69 S.W.
529, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902).
171
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(1) (1985).
172
See id. at § 210.5(2).
173
See State v. Lassiter, 484 A.2d 13, 15–17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)
(charging with murder).
174
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (1985) (“Aiding or Soliciting Suicide as an
Independent Offense. A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit
suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or
an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor.”).
175
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
176
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2015) (manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE §
401 (West 2016) (felony); FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2015) (manslaughter, second degree
felony). But compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 2015) (promoting a suicide
attempt is a class E felony with a maximum prison sentence of four years), with N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2015) (second degree manslaughter is a class C felony
with a maximum sentence of fifteen years).
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would be to expand the Model Penal Code provision to distinguish
between the different types of assistance. Thus, under such a statute,
a defendant is guilty of assistance to suicide if he or she: (1)
“intentionally provides the means by which suicide is attempted or
committed” or (2) intentionally acts as a suicide participant.177 A
suicide participant is a person, other than the victim, who “actively,
affirmatively participates in the act of suicide.”178 In other words,
liability for assisting suicide would be limited to those who are both the
actual and proximate cause of the victim’s suicide. Alternatively, the
state could choose to limit liability to those who physically participate
in the suicide.179 If a state legislature wants the statute’s prohibition to
reach conduct that is merely verbal encouragement, they can include
a prohibition for causing or soliciting a suicide by means of duress. If
the victim acted under duress, their intervening act would not be the
kind of free, deliberate, and informed act that breaks the causal chain
between the defendant’s act and the ensuing suicide. The fact-finder
at trial would then determine whether the defendant’s actions rose to
the level of duress.
B. Evaluating the Alternatives
Society punishes criminals in order to achieve certain goals.
Criminal punishment seeks to attain four goals: deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.180
An adequate
criminal punishment should achieve one or more of these goals.181
This section will compare how well manslaughter and the proposed
177

See Shaffer, supra note 82, at 372.
Id.
179
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2015) (statute criminalizing assistance to
suicide defines “assistance” as “the act of physically helping or physically providing the
means”). After the Michigan courts struggled to apply manslaughter and murder
theories in cases like Roberts and Campbell, the Michigan legislature enacted a statute
that prohibits providing the physical means for suicide or participating in the physical
act of suicide if the defendant knew that the victim intended to commit suicide. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1027 (2016).
180
See, e.g., Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A
History of Incompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 398–403 (1996); Gregory G. Jackson,
Punishments for Reckless Skiing–Is the Law Too Extreme?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 619, 634–39
(2002); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 1.5 (2d ed. 2015).
181
According to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a court imposing a criminal
sentence shall consider the need for the sentence imposed to: (1) “reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense” (retributivism); (2) “afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct” (deterrence); (3) “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant” (restraint); and (4) “provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner” (rehabilitation). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012).
178
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specific statute achieves each of these goals.
1. Deterrence
One goal of criminal punishment is deterrence. There are two
kinds of deterrence: specific deterrence and general deterrence.
According to the theory of specific deterrence, criminal punishment
aims to deter the criminal, rather than others, from committing
further crimes, by giving her an unpleasant experience she will not
want to endure again.182 This theory of punishment requires the
deterrence of the particular defendant. Under this view, Michelle
Carter should be prosecuted so that she will not commit this crime
again. However, there is no evidence that Michelle made Conrad
suicidal or sought him out for that reason. To the contrary, Conrad
was suicidal and was treated for depression and mental illness before
he even met Michelle.183 There is also evidence that Michelle regretted
not doing more to prevent Conrad from killing himself.184 A statutory
prohibition punishes Michelle, while allowing leniency to be tailored
to the crime she committed. Restraint185 and rehabilitation,186 which
are discussed further below, are often considered types of specific
deterrence.187
General deterrence argues for the punishment of offenders as a
way of sending a message to other people who might consider
engaging in the same conduct in the future. According to the general
deterrence theory, other people will see the harsh punishment
imposed upon the offender and will not want to suffer the same fate,
so they will not engage in the behavior.188 In the case of encouraging
or aiding suicide, criminal prosecution seeks to deter people from
encouraging another’s suicide to advance their own personal motives,
like pursuing an inheritance or ridding themselves of a burdensome
dependent.189
There is evidence that general deterrence is mildly effective for

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

See LAFAVE, supra note 180.
See Phillip, supra note 11.
See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 65, at 20.
See infra Part V.B.ii.
See infra Part V.B.iii.
See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 80, at 633.
See id. at 631.
See Wright, supra note 85, at 162.
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malum prohibitum190 offenses, but not for other kinds of crime.191 Three
requirements must be met in order for this kind of deterrence to be
effective.192 First, the potential offender must know of the law
prohibiting the conduct.193 Second, the offender must perceive the
cost of violating the law as greater than any benefit he or she will derive
from committing the crime.194 Lastly, the potential offender must be
able and willing to allow this knowledge to influence his or her
actions.195 Under this analysis, it is unlikely that charging Michelle with
manslaughter will deter others from engaging in the same behavior.
First, the public is probably unaware that some jurisdictions
punish encouraging suicide, in any form, as murder or manslaughter.
Michelle’s case has been widely reported and has brought attention to
the possibility of being charged with involuntary manslaughter for
encouraging suicide. Prior to her case, however, the average person
was likely unaware that verbal encouragement—or even incitement—
of suicide could be manslaughter. As time passes and Michelle’s case
fades from the public eye, the general population will again forget, and
any potential deterrent effect will be lost. A specific statute that
proscribes certain kinds of encouragement and assistance of suicide
would leave no doubt in the mind of both law enforcement and citizens
that such acts are prohibited. A clear, straightforward prohibition on
encouragement or assistance to suicide would at least increase the
likelihood that a potential offender can understand the law.196
Second, effective general deterrence requires the offender to
perceive the cost of punishment to be greater than any benefit from
the violation. Even those who are aware of the possibility of being
charged with manslaughter for encouraging another’s suicide might
still believe that they are unlikely to be caught or prosecuted. This will
influence their balancing of the costs and benefits of committing the
prohibited act. For example, Michelle asked Conrad to delete their
text message conversations before committing suicide so that she

190

An offense is categorized as malum prohibitum if it is wrong only because it is
proscribed by law, as opposed to malum in se offenses, which are inherently wrong. See
Barnes, supra note 80, at 646.
191
See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE, at 45–46 (1974).
192
See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003)
(arguing that criminal punishment does very little to deter potential offenders).
193
See id. at 954.
194
See id.
195
See id. at 954–56.
196
See id. at 989 (“[T]here are ways in which knowledge of [a criminal law rule]
can be increased. . . . [A] bare prohibition itself is the easiest rule to convey.”).
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would not be associated with his death.197 Furthermore, prosecution
for encouraging suicide is sporadic and often leads to wildly
inconsistent outcomes.198 This is certainly true in Michelle’s case. The
last reported case of a charge of manslaughter for encouraging suicide
in Massachusetts was Persampieri v. Commonwealth in 1961.199 Delay
between the commission of the act and the eventual punishment may
also distort any cost-benefit analysis a potential offender might
undertake, making benefits seem much greater than any costs which
he or she believes to be far off.200 Michelle’s case has been significantly
delayed by motions and arguments about whether or not her actions
fit the definition of involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts
precedent.201 If Massachusetts passed the proposed statute that
specifically prohibited encouraging suicide, such issues would be
easier to decide because the statute would define the offense. As
jurisprudence develops, appellate courts would resolve ambiguities
that remain in the application of the statute.
The final prerequisite for deterrence to be effective requires that
the offender use the calculation of costs against benefits to influence
his or her decisions. It is likely that offenders do not consider the legal
implications of their acts at all. For example, use of drugs and alcohol
often impairs an offender’s judgment.202 Critics of the theory of both
general and specific deterrence argue that the idea of a criminal
rational actor is an oxymoron.203 This is especially true in situations rife
with emotion like those involving suicide.204 Michelle probably did not
197

See Phillip, supra note 11.
See Shaffer, supra note 82, at 370–71 (arguing that police and prosecutorial
discretion tends to make prosecution of encouraging suicide ineffective and results in
injustice whenever charges are pursued).
199
See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961). Some
sources reported that Bristol County District Attorney Thomas Quinn had a
relationship with Conrad’s family, and he eventually recused himself from the case.
CBS BOS., supra note 6. It is not clear whether his relationship influenced the decision
to bring charges against Michelle.
200
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954.
201
Conrad committed suicide in July 2014, and the Judge decided the Defendant’s
motion to dismiss in September 2015. See Miller, supra note 52.
202
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954–56.
203
See Barnes, supra note 80, at 631; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME 118 (rev. ed. 1983) (“[S]ome scholars contend that a large fraction of crime is
committed by persons who are so impulsive, irrational, or abnormal that even if there
were no delay, uncertainty, or ignorance attached to the consequences of criminality,
we would still have a lot of crime.”).
204
See generally Herbert Hendin, Suicide and the Request for Assisted Suicide Meaning
and Motivation, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 285, 287–99 (1996) (identifying depression,
ambivalence, and psychodynamics as factors that influence an individual’s decision to
commit suicide or request physician assisted suicide).
198
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consider the costs or possible consequences of her encouragement in
the weeks leading up to Conrad’s suicide. It was not until afterwards
that she seemed to consider that she could be prosecuted for her
involvement.205
2. Restraint
Restraint, also called incapacitation, is a theory of punishment
focused on removing the criminal from society.206 According to this
theory, if a defendant is imprisoned or restrained in some way, then he
or she cannot commit more crimes and cannot possibly do more harm
to society.207 The only way to incapacitate an offender completely is to
put them to death, since that will permanently remove them from
society.208 Any other form of incapacitation is by definition less than
complete. Therefore, unless the state sentenced all offenders to death
or life in prison, how well punishment achieves incapacitation is a
matter of degree. Even offenders serving life in prison without
possibility of parole remain members of prison society and, in some
cases, can continue their life of crime within the prison.209 Restraint
can, however, be furthered through other means. When offenders are
put in prison, they are isolated from general society for some period of
time, protecting at least some part of the population from their crimes.
Electronic monitoring systems provide an alternative to incarceration
while still restraining the offender to some degree.210 In the case of
punishing suicide encouragement, prosecution for manslaughter
would carry a longer prison term than would a specific statute, which
would impose a lighter sentence. Therefore, if removing Michelle
205

Michelle requested that Conrad delete her text messages from his phone on
the night he committed suicide, and deleted them from her own phone as well.
Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 23. This
is the first indication that Michelle was aware that her actions were wrong. She later
sent text messages to her friend Samantha expressing her fear that she might be
prosecuted. See id. at 29.
206
See Jackson, supra note 180, at 637.
207
See Dugger, supra note 180, at 401.
208
See id. at 402.
209
Id. (“[A] life sentence (most generally, life without the possibility of parole) also
keeps [offenders] away from us. It just keeps them alive and away from us, in their
own society, rather than dead and away from us.”); see also Barnes, supra note 80, at 632
(“Is a murderer really incapacitated if he murders other prisoners while behind
bars?”).
210
Massachusetts utilizes an electronic monitoring program as an alternative to
incarceration and to provide an extra level of supervision of probationers and
parolees. See generally The Electronic Monitoring Program Fact Sheet 2014, MASS. PROB.
SERV. 1, http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/probation/elmofactsheet.pdf (last visited
Apr. 9, 2016).
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from the general public were the ultimate goal, a charge of
manslaughter would better achieve it.
There is, however, no reason to believe that time in prison would
protect other suicidal individuals in society. In fact, research indicates
that in these situations, the person who commits suicide manipulates
others into assisting or encouraging their suicide.211 According to this
theory, suicidal individuals often respond to stress with “helplessness,
clinging, asking to be told what to do, and wanting to be looked after,
and a suicide attempt may be an effort to coerce such support.”212 Even
trained therapists fall victim to this coercion, so it is not surprising that
those close to the individual find themselves drawn into a loved one’s
plan for suicide.213 If this is true, then restraining the person who
assisted or encouraged the suicide will not actually protect other
suicidal individuals, who might manipulate another loved one to
encourage or help plan their suicide.214 This dynamic makes
encouraging suicide a unique situation in which incapacitation of the
offender does not actually protect those who are at risk of becoming
victims of the offense. Neither the statutory solution, nor the current
approach under a theory of manslaughter, truly serves the goal of
restraining the offender to prevent them from further hurting society.
Because incapacitation for any length of time does not protect society,
the offender should only be restrained long enough to serve the other
goals of punishment. Longer prison terms would not serve the goal of
incapacitation—protecting society—any more than a short prison
term.
3. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is a theory of punishment that argues for providing
offenders the appropriate treatment in order to reintegrate the
offender into society as law-abiding citizens.215 Unlike the other goals
211

See Shaffer, supra note 82, at 355 (“Suicidal persons often have ‘learned to use
the anxiety that they can arouse in others about their death in a coercive or
manipulative way.’”); see also Hendin, supra note 204, at 293 (noting that both
terminally ill patients who ask to die and people who are otherwise suicidal are often
motivated by a desire to test the affection of others).
212
Shaffer, supra note 82, at 355 (internal citations omitted).
213
See id. at 355–56.
214
See id. at 355.
215
See Dugger, supra note 180, at 402 (citing JAMES M. BURNS & JOSEPH S. MATTINA,
SENTENCING 1-5 (1978)). Some have criticized this theory because the definition of
rehabilitation varies, which results in different kinds of “treatment” in different
situations. See also Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231,
1261–68 (2013) (arguing that most discussions of rehabilitation as a goal of
punishment are imprecise because the concept of rehabilitation is actually made up
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of punishment, rehabilitation seeks to help the offender as well as
society. The offender benefits by being purged of their “moral
sickness” and reaccepted into society, and society benefits from
another productive member.216 According to one definition of
rehabilitation, the prosecution and punishment itself is rehabilitative
because it gives the offender more perfect information on the chances
of being caught committing the offense.217 A more contemporary
understanding of rehabilitation argues that punishment should help
the offender reintegrate into society by reforming the offender’s
character or by medical treatment.218
The punishment of encouraging suicide, whether by specific
statute or otherwise, will achieve the first kind of rehabilitation by
providing the offender with more perfect information for forming
future decisions. For example, Michelle will likely think twice before
encouraging another person to carry out a plan to commit suicide,
regardless of whether she was charged with manslaughter or under a
specific statute prohibiting encouragement.219 However, a longer
prison sentence is not likely to result in the second kind of
rehabilitation: helping the offender reintegrate into society. To the
contrary, the American prison system has largely failed to achieve
reformation of prisoners.220 Incarceration itself has been found to have
negative psychological effects on prison inmates.221 A long prison term
of various components).
216
See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in
Moral Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 143 (1993); see also Ryan, supra note 215,
at 1264–67.
217
See Barnes, supra note 80, at 634.
218
See Ryan, supra note 215, at 1264–65; see also Meghan Ryan, Science and the New
Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261, 327–28 (2015) [hereinafter Science] (“Today,
commentators on rehabilitation often focus almost exclusively on offenders’ behaviors
and reintegration into society.”).
219
Some scholars have criticized this assumption, arguing that it fails to take
account of recidivism rates among offenders. See Barnes, supra note 80, at 634; Ryan,
supra note 215, at 1267 (“[A]ny potential benefits of reintegrating rehabilitated
offenders back into society also hinge on the offenders not re-offending.”). However,
because prosecution for encouraging or assisting suicide is sporadic and inconsistent,
there is no data regarding rates of recidivism.
220
See Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War
on Prisoners,” 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 191 (2010) (documenting the failure of
rehabilitative programs in American corrections because “program-oriented officials
typically lacked funding and personnel commensurate to the task at hand”).
221
See id. at 192 (“Rather than focusing exclusively on the presumed pathology of
prisoners to account for post-prison problems and possible recidivism, [in their book
C-Unit: Search for Community in Prison, Studt, Messinger, and Wilson’s analysis] placed
part of the blame on the nature of institutions in which [the prisoners] had been kept.
It was one sign among many of a growing recognition that powerful and potentially
destructive forces at work in prison, even within the very programs that were designed

ZAVALA (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/27/2016 7:57 PM

COMMENT

325

may exacerbate Michelle’s emotional and psychological problems,
making her more likely to commit a crime in the future. Instead,
rehabilitation may justify a shortened sentence or diversion to nonincarcerative programs because the offender is more likely to improve
outside of prison.222 Conviction under a statute for assisting or
encouraging suicide would result in a shorter prison term than a
conviction for manslaughter, thus reducing the possibility that
incarceration can inflict severe negative psychological effects on
Michelle and other offenders like her.
4. Retribution
Lastly, the theory of retribution argues that offenders should be
punished because “crime inherently merits punishment.”223
Punishment for retribution gives offenders what they deserve and
prevents the punishment of those who do not deserve it. Retributive
punishment does not seek to achieve social benefits, but instead seeks
to inflict harm on someone who deserves it.224 Thus, retributive theory
calls for punishment even when no social benefit will result, a fact that
sets it apart from the other utilitarian theories of punishment.225
Though sometimes considered the original purpose of punishment,226
recent scholarship has recast retributivism as a method of limiting
punishment, giving offenders only as much punishment as they
deserve.227 This gives rise to the difficulty with assigning desert: how
to help produce positive change in the name of rehabilitation.”) (discussing ELLIOT
STUDT ET AL., C-UNIT: SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN PRISON 3 (1968)).
222
See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2000).
223
See id. at 1315. Retribution in this sense is also called “social retribution,” as
opposed to “individual-oriented vengeance” which refers to the satisfaction that
individuals feel when a criminal is punished. See Paul Boudreaux, Criminal Law: Booth
v. Maryland and the Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 177, 184 (1989).
224
See Cotton, supra note 223, at 1315–16.
225
See id. at 1316.
226
See Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1053–54 (2012)
[hereinafter Ryan, Proximate Retribution] (tracing retributivism back to the Hammurabi
Code of about 1760 BC and the Bible).
227
See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1302 (2006) (internal quotations omitted) (criticizing the modern
view that “desert is a limiting principle, a principle that, though it would rarely tell us
the exact sanction to be imposed . . . would nevertheless give us the outer limits of
leniency and severity which should not be exceeded”); see also Ryan, Proximate
Retribution, supra note 226, at 1062 (“[T]he permutation of . . . modern retributivism
that has gained the most traction among courts and scholars is ‘limiting retributivism,’
which uses the tenets of ordinary retributivism to determine the appropriate endpoints
on an acceptable range of punishment and uses consequentialist theories to determine
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does retributivist theory decide who deserves to be punished and how
much punishment the offender deserves?228 Under one theory,
protective retributivism, punishment would look to the harms society
suffered as a result of the offender’s action.229 Under another theory,
victim vindication, the degree of punishment the offender deserves is
that which would “even the score” between the offender and the victim
of his or her crime.230
Encouraging suicide is considered a threat to the “interests in the
sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws . . .
even though the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the
request, of the suicide victim.”231 In Michelle’s case, many people
might find what Michelle did morally repugnant—something even her
lawyer, Joseph Cataldo, acknowledges.232 Some have called her actions
“horrendous,” and others have commented that “there should be some
way that society punishes this behavior.”233 Similarly, the Michigan
Court of Appeals called encouraging suicide “morally reprehensible”
but ultimately not a crime, because there was no statute in Michigan
prohibiting it.234 Punishing encouragement of suicide under a specific
statute would punish the offender, serving society’s need for
retribution. At the same time, it would also serve the limiting principle
of modern retributivism, by allowing for a shorter sentence. A shorter
sentence is more proportionate to the crime of the person who
encouraged a suicide. Under the protectionist view of retribution,
offenders should be punished in proportion to their crime. Michelle’s
actions, while reprehensible, do not rise to the level of culpability of
an accidental shooting235 or providing a gun to someone intent on
committing suicide.236 Choosing between manslaughter and a specific

the particular punishment within that range.”).
228
See Ryan, Proximate Retribution, supra note 226, at 1064–69.
229
See id. at 1066–67.
230
See id. at 1068–69.
231
In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Cal. 1983).
232
See Susan Zalkind, Is Telling Someone to Commit Suicide a Crime?, VICE (Sept. 2,
2015),
http://www.vice.com/read/is-telling-someone-to-commit-suicide-a-crime902?utm_source=vicetwitteurs (“Cataldo maintains Carter was simply exercising her
freedom of speech and that her words do not add up to a manslaughter charge. Her
messages may be disturbing, but they are not criminal, he says. ‘If you find it
repugnant that’s fine,’ says Cataldo.”).
233
See Slifer, supra note 5.
234
See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
235
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877); Commonwealth v.
McCauley, 246 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, 871
N.E.2d 1085, 1087 (Mass. Ct. App. 2007).
236
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1961).
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statute, the victim vindication theory of retributivism would also
require the less severe of the two. The evidence that the “victims” of
encouraged suicide often manipulate their loved ones into helping
them tends to show that there is much less of a score to “even” in the
case of this specific crime.237
VI. CONCLUSION
When the news spread that Bristol County Massachusetts was
charging Michelle Carter with manslaughter for encouraging her
boyfriend to commit suicide, some questioned whether her actions
actually constituted manslaughter.238 Her actions did not fit the
public’s preconceived notion of what manslaughter is. Her case
seemed to be an anomaly, prompting widespread media attention.
However, a close look at both at English common law and cases in
various states proves that her case is not the first of its kind. Because
Massachusetts law allows prosecutors to treat any and all
encouragement or assistance of suicide under a theory of
manslaughter, there have been inconsistent outcomes that do little to
advance the goals of punishment. As the above analysis indicates, a
specific statute that prohibits encouragement and assistance of suicide
will better serve the goals of punishment and is preferable to the
current approach. A statutory solution will allow the legislature within
each state to clarify this area of law; otherwise, prosecutors will
continue to make due with an unclear legal landscape and an
antiquated punishment for an act that has become more nuanced due
to modern technology.

237
238

See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
See Zalkind, supra note 232.

